Trapped in the wrong system

  

To better understand the reasons behind this continuous decline, we must first recognise that the Netherlands has traditionally been a country of associations. Sports clubs are non-profit by nature, which means that financial resources in this landscape are generally limited. In such an environment, an overarching federation is a necessary “evil”, and federation memberships are therefore typically mandatory in order to fund it. This is perfectly logical. It is a highly social system that relies heavily on volunteers. The purpose of this system is to connect communities, organise sports, and ensure continuity through federations. To maintain and stimulate this system, NOC*NSF provides federations with an annual subsidy per registered member. The entire system is therefore built on interdependencies. In contrast to traditional association-based sports such as tennis and rowing, squash in the Netherlands is primarily played at commercial clubs operating for profit. Squash is a revenue model, and players (including the data generated by their playing activity) are considered valuable business assets. An overarching federation is therefore far less necessary, and mandatory memberships are undesirable. This represents a completely different landscape—one that is based on freedoms rather than obligations.

  

That squash initially embedded itself within the association-based landscape is, of course, not surprising. It was not only standard practice at the time; it was virtually the only available model. The fact that the squash federation never identified this as a problem over the years is easily explained by the numbing effect that free money can have on rational thinking. As a result, the federation never truly questioned whether it was, by the very nature of the subsidy scheme, even an intended beneficiary at all. And because NOC*NSF funding has become the primary lifeline of the Squash Federation Netherlands (SBN), this subsidy now keeps SBN trapped in a landscape where it simply does not belong—condemning it to a slow demise.

Indeed, subsidy is the squash federation’s main lifeline. And because this subsidy is based on membership numbers, member recruitment has therefore become the central pillar of its policy. In the association-based landscape, however, there is no profit motive and memberships are compulsory—effectively resulting in free money. In the commercial landscape, memberships are voluntary. If the squash federation wants to qualify for NOC*NSF subsidies, it must therefore bind members individually, which requires a disproportionate amount of time and effort. Moreover, to attract and retain individual members, the federation must give substantive value to membership—something that, in turn, costs a significant amount of money. On top of that, these costs are incurred before any benefits materialise, making the return on investment highly uncertain. What, in the commercial system, does the squash federation actually have to offer the individual squash player at all?

SBN is thus operating with an uncertain and time-consuming revenue model, characterised by low or even negative margins and a misaligned target group. By focusing on this model, SBN fails to collect money where it is actually being earned—where it is, in fact, waiting to be invested back into the sport in support of business operations: at the commercial squash club. At present, the annual federation fee paid by squash clubs is based on the assumption that clubs are non-profit associations, and is therefore far too low. If the squash federation were to serve clubs in a tailored manner and actively promote the sport as a whole, it could make a positive contribution to club operations and thereby claim a position as part of the revenue model. This is particularly relevant given that the squash federation occupies the unique position of being the sport’s natural representative body.

The low membership numbers have understandably generated a fair amount of negativity towards the federation within the squash community, and the results certainly justify that sentiment. Yet, paradoxically, there is also reason for optimism. Squash is becoming an Olympic sport. Global powerhouses such as the United States and China are investing heavily to establish leading positions in squash. The PSA has been successful in increasing the sport’s visibility and appeal to an ever-growing audience. Many squash clubs are performing well financially, and SBN could easily ride this wave of momentum. All it needs to do is take an honest look in the mirror and change course. Show realism. In the association-based landscape, SBN is an ugly duckling. In the commercial landscape, it could become a major force—and a shining example for squash federations worldwide. It only takes one decision. Yes, we can!

A brief final note. For years, there has been persistent talk behind the scenes that it might be a better idea to place the squash federation under the umbrella of the KNLTB. At first glance, this may sound appealing to many, given that success has been elusive over the past 40 years. However, the tennis federation is the textbook example of an organisation operating within the association-based landscape—precisely the landscape that has just been identified as offering no added value to commercial squash clubs or individual squash players. Quite apart from the question of whether the tennis federation would even want to absorb the squash federation, the likely outcome would be that squash clubs would feel underserved and eventually establish their own federation. There is, incidentally, a strong chance that for the same reasons padel clubs will eventually leave the tennis federation as well. Perhaps, from that perspective, it would not be such a bad idea to start preparing for a Dutch Squash and Padel Federation after all.